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AIR TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MA-
TERIALS AND PASSENGER PROTECTION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
On April 5th, 1974, Delta Airlines Flight 311 from Washing-
ton, D.C., to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, contained an improperly
packaged and labeled shipment of radioactive Iridium 92 which
leaked in flight. The leakage was not discovered until two days
later by monitoring equipment at the receiver's warehouse. A
cargo handler at the Baton Rouge Airport received a heavy dose
of radiation, and the 157 passengers and seven crew members re-
ceived substantial contamination.1  This incident illustrates the
fact that if one is contemplating air travel in the immediate fu-
ture, it would be wise to consider the possibility that one might
be exposed to potentially harmful radiation while aboard the
plane. Such radiation could seriously affect not only one's health
and life expectancy, but that of one's descendants as weln.
From its infancy in the days after the Second World War,
the global market for atomic energy technology has grown at a
steady rate. The development of a myriad of new products and
techniques has created demands where none previously existed.
2
This burgeoning industry now has worldwide suppliers as well as
customers.' As a result, there has been an increase in the inter-
national transportation of some of the more hazardous materials
used in the atomic energy related industries. Because no exact
data are available on the volume of international shipments,4 this
1. See Hearings Before Subcomm. of House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on Aircraft Radiation Incident, April 1974, and Aircraft Con-
tamination Incident, December 1971-January 1972; 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1974)
[hereinafter cited as AIRCRAFT RADIATION HEARINGS].
2. One area which has attracted companies in Europe and the United States
is the nuclear powered pacemaker for heart patients. Although some forty test
implants have been made in Europe, the United States is just getting into this area.
Moline Herald, September 8, 1972, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
3. International dealers in radioactive pharmaceuticals include: Curtis Nu-
clear Corp., Los Angeles, California; Amersham/Searle, the Netherlands; Phar-
macia Laboratories, Upsalon, Sweden; and McGraw Laboratories, Australia.
AEC, THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 1974, at 76 (1974).
4. Exhaustive research by the author has failed to reveal any national or
international source of data on the volume of international shipments of radioac-
tive materials.
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comment will rely primarily on a detailed analysis of the United
States experience in this area as illustrative of the problems to be
faced on a multinational scale.
In the United States last year, there were an estimated one
million shipments of radioactive materials by all types of carriers.
Approximately seventy-five to ninety percent of these were radio-
active pharmaceuticals, 5 the majority of which were shipped by air
aboard passenger carrying aircraft.6 The heavy dependence on
air shipment of the radiopharmaceutical industry both here and
abroad is dictated by the rapid deterioration rate (the short half-
life) of the substances shipped primarily for use in hospitals.
7
More then 2,500 hospitals in this country have nuclear medicine
departments, and more than 5,000 American doctors and medical
laboratories are using radioisotopes in diagnosis and treatment.8
The remaining ten to twenty-five percent of air shipments, the
non-radiopharmaceuticals, include special nuclear materials,9 and
the whole range of radioactive substances currently in use in
American industry.' By their very nature, these latter substances
have relatively longer half-lives and are capable of being for-
warded via surface transportation without substantial loss through
deterioration.
The total number of domestic shipments of radioactive mate-
rials is projected to surpass one million in 1975 and to continue to
show an increase every year thereafter. Passenger aircraft will
probably remain the predominant mode of transportation. 1' Thus,
one's chances of flying with radioactive cargo are presently rated
5. Radioactive pharmaceuticals, also referred to as "radiopharmaceuticals",
are radioactive substances used in the diagnosis and treatment of certain diseases.
See generally 49 C.F.R. § 173.390 (1968).
6. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, SPECIAL STUDY OF THE CAR-
RIAGE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS BY AIR, at 4, (1972). [hereinafter cited as
NTSB REPORT].
7. According to the Society For Nuclear Medicine, approximately one pa-
tient out of every four admitted to hospitals today is directly benefitted from the
use of medical isotopes, particularly the short lived Technitium 99M, which has
a six hour half-life. SPECIAL PANEL TO STUDY TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR MA-
TERIALS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOAC-
TIVE MATERIAL BY PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1974). [herein-
after cited as NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT].
8. Id.
9. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 173.490 (1973).
10. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 71.64, app. C (1968).
11. NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
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at one in ten by the Airline Pilots Association.1 2  However accu-
rate this estimate, the steady increase in air carriage of radioactive
materials both here and abroad can only increase your chances
of flying with such substances in the future.
In light of the dearth of information available on international
transportation of these materials, an evaluation of the efficiency
of international regulation is best obtained through an examination
of the existing regulatory scheme and its performance record in
the United States. This comment will discuss current interna-
tional and domestic regulations, and then proceed to analyze these
regulations as they function on a domestic basis, as well as the
impact of that performance on international regulation. It will
conclude with a proposal for needed changes in existing law.
I. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
Radioactive materials are defined as those which spontane-
ously emit ionizing radiation."i The main component of this radi-
ation, gamma rays, is capable of penetrating any substance except
thick lead.' 4 Gamma radiation is imperceptible to the human
senses; hence, a person could receive an excessive dose of which
he is not aware. 15 Such a dose, unnoticed and thus untreated,
might result in injury both to an individual and to his descendants
by inducing a wide variety of harmful effects.'
12. Butler, Coffee, Tea or Nitric Acid?, San Francisco Guardian, August
30, 1974, at 7, col. 1.
13. Nuclear radiation may be considered as the emission of either particulate
matter (alpha or beta radiation) from the nucleus of the atom, or of high energy
electromagnetic radiation called gamma rays. Gamma radiation is identical in
characteristics to the more familiar x-rays. Radiation affects a person by ionizing
the atoms of the body. It is the phenomenon of ionization or the orbital displace-
ment of one or more electrons around the atoms nucleus which distinguishes
gamma radiation from other radiation such as light rays. NTSB REPORT, supra
note 6, at 1.
14. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS,
December 1972, at 35 [hereinafter cited as TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS RE-
VIEW].
15. NTSB REPORT, supra note 6, at 6. The NTSB in this report indicates
that the public as a whole is permitted an average yearly exposure of 0.17 Rems
(170 millirem, or m/rem) per person. One rem is the measure of the effect of ra-
diation from all sources on the human body. Because of the relatively small num-
bers involved, these units are frequently expressed as millirem (one millirem equals
one thousandth of a rem). Thus, an "excessive" dose would be any exposure
which, if repeated, (as in frequent flights by an individual where exposure results)
would surpass the maximum permissible yearly dose.
16. Late somatic injuries include leukemia and other malignant diseases,
impaired fertility, cataracts, and shortening of life. Genetic injuries
1975
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In order to continue to meet the world's need for radioiso-
topic products while protecting airline passengers and crews, two
international organizations have promulgated regulations for the
safe transport of these materials. 17  The most significant agency
with responsibility for the issuance of worldwide regulations is the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The statute of the
IAEA was approved on October 23, 1956 by the Conference on
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency at United
Nations headquarters in New York.' The United States Senate
ratified the statute on June 18, 1957. There are, at present, 102
member states in the organization.
The agency's regulations for the transport of radioactive ma-
terials were first published in 1961. Subsequent revisions have
related mainly to the packaging and transport of highly radioactive
sources. 19 By 1969, the Agency's regulations had not only been
adopted by almost every international organization involved with
air transport, but many of the member states had incorporated
these regulations in their municipal law as well.
To be accepted for air transport, radioactive materials must
-be delivered to the shipper in IAEA approved shipping contain-
ers specially designed to prevent leakage. 0 Because it is thought
impossible to -totally shield radiation emission from shipping pack-
ages without using lead shielding too bulky for use in aircraft, ef-
forts have been made to limit radiation emission to within limits
thought safe for passenger exposure during flight. Transport in-
dex (TI) is the unit of measure used in connection therewith. TI
is the expression used for the radiation level in millirem per hour
manifest themselves in the offspring of irradiated individuals and may
not be apparent for many generations. Their detrimental effect may
spread throughout a population by mating of exposed individuals with
other members of the population.
Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes: The Low Level
Radiation Example, 56 IowA L. REV. 531, 539 n.18.
17. See REGULATIONS RELATING To THE CARRIAGE OF REsmCrED ARTIcLEs
By AIR, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (Montreal 1970); REGULA-
TIONS FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (rev. ed. 1973).
This comment will focus primarily on the regulations of the IAEA because that
organization has a larger and more representative membership and its standards
bind the governments of its member states where I.A.T.A. only directs corporate
air carriers.
18. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, [1957] 2 U.S.T.
1095, T.I.A.S. No. 3873 (1956).
19. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE
TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (rev. ed. 1973).
20. Id. §§ 201-08.
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at one meter from the external surface of the package involved. 21
Further, minimum separation distances in feet from package sur-
faces to personnel and photographic film are specified. 22  Mea-
surement of radiation emission is made at a distance of three feet,
which is significant because passengers' feet and legs are fre-
quently that close to packages stored in the cargo hold immedi-
ately below the passenger deck.
In order to insure international uniformity, the IAEA re-
quires that, to the greatest extent possible, member states keep
their domestic regulations in conformity with the agency's recom-
mended standards.2 3  To this end, the agency recognizes in each
state a "national competent authority" which represents that coun-
try to the agency.24 The regulations of the United States "national
competent authority," the Department of Transportation, are, with
minor variations, almost exactly the same as the IAEA standards.2 5
In light of the predominance of the United States in nuclear
medicine research and development, and reactor -technology, the
experience accumulated by this country in regulating the air trans-
portation of radioactive materials is vital to the world community.
It is not illogical to assume that, when other IAEA member states
achieve a level of technology and volume of traffic equivalent to
present levels in the United States, they will face problems parallel
to -those being faced by the United States today. In order for them
to better understand how to deal with such problems when they
arise, an analysis of the present American domestic regulatory
scheme may be helpful.
II. DOMESTIC REGULATION
Responsibility for radioactive materials transportation regula-
tion in the United States is divided between the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) and the Department of Transportation
21. 10 TI equals 200 millirem per hour at the surface of the package or 10
millirem per hour at one meter. Id. § 137.
22. Id. § 520.
23. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, ADVISORY MATERIAL FOR THE
APPLICATION OF THE IAEA TRANSPORT REGULATIONS, § 115 (1973).
24. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE
TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS § 112 (rev. ed. 1973).
25. "The DOT regulations were almost completely revised as of- January 1,
1969 to achieve a substantial conformity with the IAEA standards". TRANSPOR-
TATION REGULATIONS REVIEW, supra note 14, at 7.
5
Atchley: Air Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Passenger Protect
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
(DOT). 26  To avoid unnecessary overlapping of function and au-
thority, these two agencies issued a Joint Memorandum of Under-
standing in 1973.27 Pursuant to this agreement, the DOT is
charged with the development of standards for the packaging, clas-
sification and shipment of small quantities of radioactive materials
per shipment, while the AEC bears this responsibility for large
amounts per shipment as well as those containing fissile class na-
terials.2 8 The DOT requires notification of incidents involving ra-
dioactive packages in transit, including suspected leakage and
other accidents which occur. Conversely, the AEC requires noti-
fication of accidents only if they occur either before or after tran-
sit.29 While the AEC takes the lead in accident investigation in-
volving radioactive materials, the DOT is the "national competent
authority" with respect to the requirements of the IAEA.3° Fi-
nally, each of the two agencies is required by the Memorandum
to exchange information with the other prior to the issuance of
new regulations for those engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
transportation of radioactive materials.
31
Unfortunately, this division of authority has not worked as
planned, and the two agencies are working at cross purposes with-
out the communication which the Memorandum requires. The
situation is succinctly characterized by the Director of the Kansas
State Radiation Control Program:
There is apparently not only a lack of good working relation-
ships among the various Federal agencies but an out and out
avoidance of contacting each other on matters of mutual
26. Late in the course of the preparation of this article the Atomic Energy
Commission was dissolved and its functions transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. However, since the regulatory history detailed herein remains
largely the same, references to specific reform proposals will remain in the name
of the agency which proposed them.
27. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND THE U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FOR REGULATION OF
SAFETY IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
May 22, 1973. [hereinafter cited as MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING] [copy on
file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
28. Id. at 2. "Fissile materials" are Plutonium 238, 239, and 241, Uranium
233, 235, or any material containing any of the foregoing. See generally 49
C.F.R. § 173.389(a), 173.396(a) (1973).
29. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 27, at 5.
30. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE
TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTI V MATERIALS, § 112 (rev. ed. 1973).
31. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 27, at 6.
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interest. Each seems to be jealously guarding its own
fragmented radiation control programA
2
In recent years, the increasing number of reported accidents
demonstrates that shippers and carriers either do not understand
the various regulations, or do not choose to follow them. 3 This
tendency has gone unchecked because of a lack of proper investi-
gation and enforcement by both agencies. In his 1973 Report
to the Congress, the Comptroller General of the United States
characterized the DOT inspection effort as "small and unsystem-
atic". 4 The report on radioactive materials accidents of the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board also indicates that the AEC
control over packaging for radioactive materials "suggest[s] the
possible existence of deficiencies in the performance criteria spec-




The Comptroller General's report further pointed out that
the discrepancies in the present regulatory scheme were en-
couraged because the agencies involved hesitated to prosecute vio-
lators of the regulations due to the difficulty of processing claims,
and the knowledge on the part of inspectors that cases were fre-
quently closed with only minimal penalties. 6 Indeed, violations
of the regulations would seem to be wholesale, leading the Senate
Commerce Committee, after a thorough analysis, to conclude that
"noncompliance is the rule rather than the exception in this dan-
gerous business.
'3 7
This state of confusion has not gone unnoticed in the aviation
industry. In response to the recent increase in incidents involving
32. Report by Comptroller General to the Joint Committee on Atomic En-
ergy, Opportunity for Improving AEC's Administration of Agreements with States
Regulating Users of Radioactive Materials, 15 ATOM. EN. L.J. 63, 123 (1973).
33. The Secretary of Transportation indicated that in 1973 there were 6,014
"incidents" of unintentional release of hazardous substances in the course of trans-
portation. While only a portion of these accidents involved radioactive materials,
exact data are difficult to gather. As William Bums, Director of the Office of
Hazardous Materials testified before the Senate Commerce Committee, there is
evidence to suggest that few of the carriers actually report the hazardous materials
incidents they are supposed to report. SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, REPORT
ON S. 4057, S. REP. No. 93-1192, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (Sept. 30, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT ON S. 4057].
34. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS ON THE NEED FOR IMPROVED INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT IN REGULAT-
ING TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, S. REP. No. B-164497, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., (1973). [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT].
35. NTSB REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.
36. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 28.
37. REPORT ON S. 4057, supra note 33, at 2.
1975
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hazardous cargo, concerned employee and citizen action groups,
such as the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Aviation
Consumer Action Project, have begun to question the efficacy of
the federal regulatory action in this area. Partly as a result of
testimony by members of ALPA's subcommittee on hazardous
materials before two congressional committees, 38 some reform
proposals have appeared. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has proposed that both packages containing radioactive
materials and appropriate sections of aircraft used in their trans-
port be scanned with proper monitoring equipment prior to
flight.3' The AEC has responded that "measures other than the
monitoring of radiation levels to provide control are necessary,"40
and urged that radioactive materials with a half-life of greater than
thirty days be banned from passenger aircraft. 4
Despite these and similar attempts at modification of the
rules, the situation in the air travel industry remains relatively un-
changed. As a result, ALPA has called for an embargo on all
hazardous materials shipments in passenger aircraft." This reac-
tion, coupled with the poor U.S. accident rate, indicates that some
part of the regulatory scheme is amiss.
A major source of difficulty and controversy in this area cen-
ters around use of the TI number. The present DOT regulations
governing the TI system's use in aircraft originated in shipping
regulations adopted on August 24, 1947, by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission for use in radiation related industries. 43  Since
then, the figures have been lowered significantly, but, although
the AEC has proposed a guide of 5 millirem per hour as the low
TI limit for civilian employees at nuclear power plants, no such
38. HEARINGS ON TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS BEFORE
SUBCOMM. OF HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMM., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 55, (1973); NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT, note 7, supra.
39. Loading and Carrying Dangerous Articles: Inspection Requirements, 39
Fed. Reg. 81 (1974).
40. UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REVISING REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATE-
RIAL IN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, SUBMITTED To THE FAA BY THE AEC (July
1974). [copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.] [hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR REVISIONS].
41. Id. at 9.
42. ALPA called on all member pilots to refuse, as of February 1, 1975,
to transport hazardous materials on passenger aircraft, including radioactive mate-
rials, except radio pharmaceuticals used in hospitals. L.A. Times, Jan. 31, 1975,
§ 1, at 5, col. 1.
43. NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
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guide has been formulated for common carrier shipments of radio-
active materials. 4 The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has
concluded that the present limits of 200 millirem per hour are too
high:
It was obvious to the panel that with increasing numbers of
radioactive materials shipments, 200 millirem per hour at the
package surface is too high and should be set at a lower limit
to protect the cargo handlers who unload the shipments.
Similarly, the panel concluded that 10 TI-10 millirem at 3
feet-is not as low as practible and should be lowered for
the better protection of passengers and crew. It was equally
obvious that what may be as low as practicable for civilian
nuclear plants-5 millirem per year-is not practicable for
shipping radioactive material and the same guide limit may not
be appropriate in the transportation industry. 45
However, in February 1972, the FAA issued a more lenient
interpretation of the recommended package separation distances.4
The FAA believes that a large number of packages may be stored
in the cargo hold so long as the TI for each group does not exceed
50, and a certain minimum separation distance is maintained be-
tween each group. This relaxation of standards is questionable
because it virtually trebles the potential exposure rate to passen-
gers.4 7  Such exposure may continue for up to eleven hours on
transoceanic flights, and it is thought that the risk of developing
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Application Of The Radioactive Materials Distance Table in F.A.R.
103.23(a), General Notice 8430 I 95, 38 Fed. Reg. 6690 (1973).
47. It has been said,
The new FAA interpretation of the table of distances allows much larger
radioactive loads per aircraft than were allowed before, and thus has the
effect of raising the maximum dose rate to passengers and crew. For
example, if in a given aircraft, the distance between the floor of the pas-
senger cabin and the floor of the cargo bin below is 57 inches, then pre-
viously only one 10-TI package, 21 inches on the side, could be carried.
Under such circumstances, the maximum nominal dose rate at seat level,
16 inches above the cabin floor, is 5.5 millirem per hour. However,
under the new FAA interpretation, four additional, similar 10-TI pack-
ages, adding to a total of 50-TI, can be stowed in the cargo compartment
provided that the distance between the package surfaces and the cabin
floor is not less than 36 inches. The resulting maximum dose rate ob-
tained with five 10-TI packages can be as high as 18 millirem per hour.
In effect then, the FAA interpretation raises the maximum permissible
dose rate to passengers and crew by more than a factor of three. Also,
under this new proposed FAA rule many passenger carrying aircraft
could carry up to five 10-TI packages, whereas none of the aircraft now
in service can do this legally. ...
Klarmann and Luszczynski, Radioactivity in Aircraft, ENVIRONMENTS, at 39 (June
1973).
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radiation-induced malignancies increases somewhat linearly with
the dosage.48
The AEC revision 49 would limit per package TI to three,
while the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy would lower the limit to one.8 0 While these recommenda-
tions would appear logical, they would be of no effect if shippers
continue to mislabel the TI number on packages as they have in
the past.5
It is submitted that the unique nature of hazards induced by
the accidental release of radiation during air transport demands
strict standards of preventive procedure, together with even
stricter compliance with, and enforcement of, such procedures.
This cannot be effected by two agencies with overlapping jurisdic-
tion, inadequate inter-communication, and questionable inspection
and enforcement techniques, as evidenced by the many examples
of negligent conduct in connection with the regulation of transpor-
tation of radioactive materials. It is obvious that regulatory modi-
fications in connection with the transport of these materials are
presently needed.
A. Revision of Domestic Regulation
Thus far, reform in radioactive materials regulation in the
U.S. has been sporadic at best. Congressional hearings and acci-
dent investigations have been conducted, but little if any action
has resulted. Under the direction of Senator Warren Magnuson
of Washington, and Congressman Thomas Kuykendall of Tennes-
see, Congress has enacted the Transportation Safety Act of
48. According to the International Air Transport Association Minimum Dis-
tance Separation Tables, a person could receive a maximum dose rate of 14 milli-
rem per hour, or up to 70 millirem on a five hour flight. It is easy to see how
the NTSB-recommended national limit for the general public of 170 millirem per
year, supra note 15, might be surpassed by most travelling businessmen, to say
nothing of stewardesses and flight crews, in less than a year. Morgan, Radiation
Aloft, ENVIRONMENTS, at 29 (Dec. 1972).
49. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISIONS, supra note 40, at 7.
50. NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
51. See note 33, supra, and accompanying text. The NTSB found that the
lack or incorrect designation of TI number to be one of the most frequent exam-
ples of shipper error. NTSB REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. There was no TI num-
ber on the package involved in the Delta Airlines incident last April. AiRcRAFr
RADIATION HEARINGS, supra note 1. In all fairness to the manufacturers involved
in radioactive materials transport, it must be noted that it is more often the maze
of confusing and often conflicting sets of rules of the several agencies involved
rather than any intent to deceive, that accounts for the incorrect labeling involved.
Vol. 5
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1974.52 The provisions of the bill pertinent to the air transport
of radioactive materials will: (1) increase the regulatory authority
and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Transportation to in-
clude jurisdiction over manufacturers of radioactive materials
packaging;53 (2) require the Secretary to designate certain radio-
active shipments as "hazardous" or "ultrahazardous", and to regis-
ter handlers in the latter category every two years; 54 (3) compel
the Secretary to ban from passenger flights all but radioactive sub-
stances used in diagnosis and treatment of patients;55 and (4) au-
thorize the Secretary to subject violators of the Act's provisions
to civil penalties of up to $10,000, and criminal penalties of up
to $25,000 or five years imprisonment.5 6
By this broad mandate, the Transportation Safety Act at-
tempts to centralize federal regulation in the Secretary of Trans-
portation and better ensure its enforcement. The most innovative
provision is the penalty clause which introduces stem measures
into this field of legislation for the first time. It also goes a step
further than any other governmental act by banning all but radio-
pharmaceuticals from passenger flights, a move the government
has heretofore resisted.5 7
However thorough it is, the Act fails to adopt two important
procedures which have been advocated by ALPA: active moni-
toring of all radioactive materials packages, and a certification pro-
gram for proper training in radioactive materials handling pro-
cedures for shippers and carriers."' While the former proposal
has been agreed to in principle by the DOT through the FAA,59
neither it nor the latter have been adopted. The chief objection
to both is the cost involved in such projects. But an existing sys-
tem may present a solution to both problems.
52. 49 U.S.C. § 1801 (1974).
53. Id. § 105(a).
54. Id. §§ 104, 196.
55. Id. § 108.
56. Id. § 110.
57. The Civil Aeronautics Board rejected a tariff proposal by Delta Airlines
which would have banned from passenger flights all radioactive substances other
than those intended for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes. CAB, NON-ACCEPT-
ANCE OF CERTAIN RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PROPOSED BY DELTA AIRLINES, ORDER
OF REJECTION No. 74-9-14 (Sept. 5, 1974).
58. Resolution of the 20th Executive Board Meeting of the Air Line Pilots
Association, May 29-30, 1974.
59. Loading and Carrying Dangerous Articles: Inspection Requirements, 39
Fed. Reg. 81 (1974).
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B. Feasibility of National Monitoring
A practical and relatively inexpensive monitoring program is
feasible by merely designating certain -areas at airports in the
mainstream of radioactive materials traffic as sites for control cen-
ters for such materials. Such a program is currently in operation
at the Metropolitan Airport in Minneapolis.6 '  The Director of
Noise Abatement and Environmental Control at the Minneapolis
airport divides the total cost of the monitoring system between
local shippers and carriers and receives a standard, per package
fee to recover the total cost of the system. 6' The system has suc-
cessfully withstood an attack based on grounds of Federal pre-
emption of the field of radioactive materials control, 62 but has
been criticized elsewhere as a hindrance to interstate commerce,
and a function better left to the Federal Government.63
As provided in the Transportation Safety Act, the Secretary
has the power to effect numerous improvements in this area on
a national scale.64 In addition to these measures, the Secretary
should adopt the AEC proposal to lower the per package TI limit
from 10 to 3. 5 A national monitoring system at major airports
would achieve the dual purpose of assuring conformity with the
60. In view of the federal unwillingness to provide adequate monitoring
of radioactive shipments, the MAC (Metropolitan Airport Commission),
primarily through the efforts of St. Paul mayor Lawrence D. Cohen, en-
acted its own monitoring system to provide a higher degreee of safety
to freight workers, flight crews, and the air traveling public.
Letter to the author from Mr. Steven Collins, Administrative Aid, Environmental
Affairs, Metropolitan Airport Commission, Oct. 21, 1974 [copy on file at CALIF.
W. INT'L L.J.].
61. Id.
62. Braniff Airways v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airport Commis-
sion, Civil No. 3-74; (D. Minn., filed July 14, 1974).
63. While the panel considers the action taken by Delta and MAC to
be proper and timely, the panel has concern that if each local govern-
ment or airline were to set up a monitoring system, the multiplicity of
rules and regulations and standards, which might eventually develop in
different sections of the United States, would cause confusion and unnec-
essarily hinder the interstate transportation of radioactive material.
What is needed is an effective and standardized Federal program of en-
forceable regulations.
NUCLEAR MATERIALS REPORT, supra note 7, at 12.
64. The Act provides:
Within 90 days after the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall
issue regulations, in accordance with this section and pursuant to Section
105 of this Act, with respect to the transportation of radioactive mate-
rials on any passenger carrying aircraft in air commerce, as defined in
Section 101 (4) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT OF 1974, H.R. Doc. No. 15223, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess., at 23 (1974).
65. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISIONS, supra note 40.
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more stringent TI limits and preventing leaking packages from
ever reaching aircraft. In addition, the expense of such facilities
could easily be user-funded by distributing its costs among the
shippers and carriers of radioactive materials. Such centralization
of function would also make monitoring by DOT officials much
easier.66
Despite stringent pre-flight control, it is possible that circum-
stances encountered in flight might cause packages to begin to
leak once on board. In such a case, an on-board monitoring sys-
tem would be necessary. This could be implemented by the use
of personal dosimeters by airline personnel or a network of film
badges mounted aboard the aircraft. 7 Upon detection, responsi-
ble safety personnel at the point of destination could be alerted,




With the implementation of the Act and these additional
measures, the United States would not only eliminate the present
confusion and duplication of effort, but would also provide the
necessary added protection to human life at little expense to the
aviation and nuclear material industries. It is submitted that, to the
extent that experience has proven United States standards for the
air carriage of radioactive materials to be inefficient and in need of
revision, so too are the identical IAEA international regulations.
Absent modification of these rules, similar accidents in air trans-
port are bound to happen. A recent radiation related accident in
Europe69 furnished unfortunate proof of this, and, if the American
safety record is exemplary, other international incidents will sadly
follow. The need for changes in the international regulatory
scheme is clearly demonstrated by these experiences. But, with
or without such revision, in light of the probability of additional
66. Id. § 106(b).
67. Ionization chambers, or dosimeters, are susceptible to certain error in
measurement of radiation levels. But, used in conjunction with film badges, the
two are a good indication of actual dose received. The use and reliability of film
badges and dosimeter records as evidence is well treated in Hutton, Evidentiary
Problems in Proving Radiation Injury, 46 GEORGETOWN L.J. 52 (1957).
68. This avoids the situation where a contaminated aircraft inadvertently
might spread its contaminating radiation to airport equipment and personnel. See
note 96, infra, and accompanying text.
69. The Association Press reported that a capsule containing radioactive ma-
terial aboard a British aircraft burst on landing at Dusseldorf, Germany, and that
the plane required "emergency decontamination". San Diego Evening Tribune,
Oct. 22, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
1975.
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mishaps, an examination of the legal consequences involved in
such an accident is necessary.
III. RELIEF FOR HARMFUL EXPOSURE To RADIATION
Since no exact data are available regarding the volume of in-
ternational shipments of radioactive materials, it is difficult to esti-
mate the number of shippers, carriers, and passengers involved.7"
However, as the level of sophistication of nuclear industrial tech-
nology rises throughout the world, an increase in international air
traffic in radioactive materials comparable to that currently being
experienced in the United States can be expected. Regardless
of the total volume of this traffic, even a single incident of radia-
tion leakage resulting in passenger exposure could generate suits
for damages by the passengers so exposed and, perhaps, by their
descendants as well. It will be recalled71 that many of the harmful
(and thus compensable) effects of radiation exposure may not be
immediately apparent. The question remains as to whether a per-
son who has been exposed to potentially harmful radiation has a
compensable injury. While the answer to this question has varied
considerably in the American courts, 72 certain independent factors
must be considered where international aviation is concerned.
A. The Warsaw Convention and the Guatemala Protocol
Under the terms of the Warsaw Convention, 73 there are cre-
ated both a presumption of liability on the part of the carrier for
death or bodily injury arising out of international transportation,
and a concomitant limitation of liability for such injury to 125,000
70. T.I.A.S. Cumulative Index Volume 4, lists 49 countries with one or more
treaties on cooperation for use of atomic energy, in addition to 21 agreements be-
tween the U.S. and other countries for application of the IAEA safeguards on
transport of materials. Also of note is the U.S. agreement with EURATOM for
trade in nuclear materials, [1958] U.S.T. 1116, T.I.A.S. No. 4091 (1958). See
also, CAMERON, COHEN, ERIKSSON, OLSON, PAYNE, SELIGMAN & VETRER, RADIO-
ACTIVE NUCLIDES AND THEIR APPLICATION AS AN IMPORTANT TOOL FOR THE BENE-
FIT OF LESS DEVELOPED AREAS (IAEA, Vienna 1973).
71. See note 16, supra, and accompanying text.
72. See generally Hutton, Evidentiary Problems in Proving Radiation Injury,
46 GEORGETOWN L.J. 52 (1957); Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for
Remote Causes: The Low Level Radiation Example, 56 IOWA L. REV. 531 (1971);
Stason, Tort Liability for Radiation Injuries, 12 VAND. L. REV. 145 (1959); See
also 21 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1968).
73. Convention For The Unification of Certain Rules Relating To Interna-
national Carriage By Air, 49 Stat. 3000. T.S. No. 876 (1929) [hereinafter cited
as the WARSAW CONVENTION].
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francs, ($8,300) per passenger. 74  The presumption may be re-
butted by a showing that the carrier used due care to avoid the
damage, or that the damage itself was unavoidable regardless of
the precautions taken.75
On November 15, 1965, the United States deposited its
formal denunciation of the convention with the Polish govern-
ment.76 The day before the denunciation was to become effec-
tive, the United States formally withdrew it and announced an in-
terim agreement which provided that the majority of airlines
would agree to include in their tariffs an agreement by which the
carrier would waive its defense of due care under article 20, 7 7 as
well as its limitation on liability under the convention up to
$75,000.78 Together, the agreement and tariffs filed under it con-
stitute the Montreal Agreement. 79  This agreement does not
change the Warsaw Convention in form, but imposes a contractual
notion of liability on all international commerce involving the
United States. 0 Therefore, on flights not originating, crossing
over, or ending in the United States, the rule of the Warsaw Con-
vention regarding the defense of due care"' is still in effect.
Recognition of the ability of the airlines to provide indemnifi-
cation for injuries caused to passengers led to the drafting of the
Guatemala Protocol in 1971.82 The two main features of the Pro-
tocol are the establishment of absolute liability for all carriers in
international aviation in any part of the world, thus abolishing the
defense of due care under the Warsaw Convention,"3 and the es-
74. 1 L. KErENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw, chs. 11, 12 (1963).
75. "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him to take such measures". WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 73, art. 20(1).
76. Dept. of State Press Release No. 268, 50 DEPT. STATE BULL. 923,
(1965).
77. See note 75, supra.
78. Liability limitations of Warsaw convention and Hague protocol, order
approving agreement, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
79. Montreal Agreement, C.A.B. order No. 18900, 39 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966).
80. KRIENDLER, supra note 74, ch. 12.
81. See note 75, supra.
82. Protocol to Amend The Convention For The Unification Of Certain
Rules Relating To International Carriage By Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Octo-
ber 1929, as amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955,
open for signature March 8, 1971, International Civil Aviation Organization Doc.
No. 8932, [reproduced in 64 DEPT. STATE BULL. 555, (1971)] [hereinafter cited
as the GUATEMALA PROTOCOL].
83. Id., art. IV:
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tablishment of a higher limit on liability of $100,000.84 The Pro-
tocol is not yet in effect because it has not been ratified by the
requisite number of states. 85
B. "Injury" Under Warsaw-Guatemala
Quite apart from issues of liability limitations and degree of
care owed is the question of bodily injury under the Warsaw Con-
vention.8 6 In a number of cases arising from the hijacking and
subsequent destruction of a Pan American World Airways Boeing
747 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,87 Ameri-
can courts were faced with the question of whether or not the
emotional distress of passengers forced to sit on the plane for two
days in searing desert heat, under continual harassment by the hi-
jackers, was compensable "injury" within the meaning of the War-
saw Convention. s8
Having already decided that a hijacking was an "accident"
under the terms of the Warsaw Convention,"a the courts had to
decide whether it was the intent of the framers of the convention
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which caused
the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. However, the car-
rier is not liable if the death or injury resulted solely from the state of
health of the passenger.
84. Id., art. VIII.
85. The terms of the Protocol provide that it shall enter into force on the
19th day after the deposit of the 13th ratification, provided that, of -the scheduled
passenger-kilometers for that year, the schedules of five of the ratifying states con-
stitute 40% of the total passenger-kilometers for that year. Id., art. 10. Upon
ratification, the protocol will become the comprehensive law governing airline lia-
bility, fully replacing the Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol, and the Montreal
Agreement. See KRIENDLER, supra note 74, ch. 12.
86. The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking.
WARSAW CONVENTION, supra note 82, art. 17 (emphasis added). There is no indi-
cation that the "personal injury" provision of Article IV of the Protocol differs
in any way from the "bodily injury" language of article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Hereafter, then, references to "injury" will be to the Warsaw Convention
meaning.
87. See Herman v. Trans World Airways, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848,
358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
88. Kriendler, An Appraisal From a Plaintiff's Viewpoint of Tort Liability
Arising From Aircraft Hijacking, 1 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 327 (1974).
89. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd 485 F,2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
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to compensate emotional distress as well as actual physical injury.
In reversing summary judgment for plaintiffs in the lower court,
the appellate division ruled that, although the hijacking was an
accident within the convention's meaning, the precise meaning of
"bodily injury" (lesion corporelle), while never discussed at Mont-
real,90 did not include mental injury unless it was a direct result
of physical injury. The court went on to state:
The inclusion of the term "bodily" to modify "injury" cannot
be ignored, and in its ordinary usage, the term "bodily"
suggests opposition to "mental" ..... In our view, therefore,
the ordinary, natural meaning of "bodily injury" as used in
article 17 connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and
excludes mental injury with no observable "bodily", as dis-
tinguished from "behavorial," manifestations."
Thus a plaintiff exposed to radiation on an international flight
could not be compensated for the anguish resulting from the ex-
posure, unless he could link this anguish to discernible physical
injury.
C. The Statute of Limitations
As has been seen,92 the physical effects of harmful irradiation
may not be readily apparent. The difficulty of proving damages
in the hijacking cases (the lack of palpable injuries), would also
arise in a suit for wrongful exposure to harmful radiation. In the
latter situation, the statute of limitations might run before plaintiff
developed detectable, and thus compensable, injuries. As stated
by one expert in the field of radiation injury litigation, "the statute
of limitations is still a formidable problem . . . insofar as tort ac-
tions based on radiation injury are concerned." '93
In the majority of foreign courts, the time allowed for the
running of the statute is more liberal than in this country.94 None-
90. Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma, 1
SYR. J. INT'L L. &. COM. 345, 347 (1974).
91. Herman v. Trans World Airways, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 402, 314 N.E.2d 848,
855, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 107 (1974).
92. See Keyes & Howarth, supra note 15.
93. Hutton, Statute of Limitations and Radiation Injury, 23 TENN. L. REV.
278, 286 (1954).
94. As Hutton states:
It is of interest to note that many foreign countries have enacted statutes
of limitation which are considerably more liberal than those generally
prevailing in this country. The limitation period for torts in England,
New Zealand, and Alberta, for example, is six years. Other countries
appear to have shorter periods than six years, but in reality are even
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theless, the physical symptoms of radiation-induced injuries often
take much longer to appear than the time allowed by even the
most liberal of these statutes of limitations.
9 5
Therefore, even if a plaintiff filed suit and stopped the run-
ning of the statute involved, he would still be faced with the task
of proving palpable "bodily injury" where none then existed. The
combination of these two procedural limitations would deprive a
person of relief should his type of radiation injury be one which
did not manifest itself for a considerably long time. While there
is no case on point involving radiation injury under the Warsaw
Convention, there is a suit, arising from the aforementioned Delta
Airlines incident awaiting trial in the United States. This case
might well provide some guidelines as to liability for radiation in-
jury in international aviation. An examination of the facts in-
volved in the case will be helpful.
D. Aircraft Radiation Incident
As a result of the radiation leakage in the Delta incident in
April, 1974, a cargo handler received a heavy dose of radiation.96
more liberal from plaintiff's viewpoint than the British statutes. Illustra-
tive of this is the statute of limitations in Switzerland. In that country
tort actions are barred after the expiration of one year which, however,
does not begin running until (1) the injured person learns of his damage,
and (2) the injured person has learned the identity of the party respon-
sible for his injury. Action is finally barred if suit is not instituted
within ten years after the date of the injury even though a plaintiff has
not learned of his injury and the person responsible therefore.
Id. at 285-286.
The IAEA has dealt with the question of the statute of limitations before.
In dealing with rights to compensation from accidents involving nuclear reactor
installations, an agency convention suggested ten years as the maximum time for
recovery. However, this convention specifically exempts radiopharmaceuticals
and any other finished products from its coverage. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE,
VIENNA, 29 APRIL-19 MAY 1963, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE, art. 1
(1963).
95. According to one scholar:
The latent period between the initial tissue injury and the manifestation
of serious symptoms may be many years. Malignant tumors following
radiation therapy have shown a relatively long latent period of twenty
years or more. The latent period for cancer of the bone resulting from
ingesting luminous paint was more than 15 years in some cases although
death occurred in other instances within 3 or 4 years following substan-
tive ingestion of such radioactive materials. Lung cancer in the case of
miners of radium-bearing ores has occurred on an average of 17 years
after occupational exposure. The latent period of skin cancer may be
as long as 50 years; and cases of thyroid cancer are reported as following
x-ray treatment in 7 to 10 years.
Hutton, Evidentiary Problems in Proving Radiation Injury, 46 GEORGETOWN L.J.
52, 55 (1957).
96. Freight handler Willie Evans received a dose estimated at 350 Reins
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While the exposure to passengers was less,9 7 it was nonetheless
far beyond the recommended annual exposure. 8 Shortly there-
after, three passengers and another cargo handler filed suit 9
against Delta Airlines and the shipper based on negligence and
strict liability, of which a key damages element was the mental
trauma allegedly resulting from the exposure. 100 The Court de-
nied a motion for a class action suit and, as of this writing, no
date had been set for trial.
In order to preserve plaintiff's right to recover for injuries
sustained but not yet apparent, the plaintiff asked for the rather
novel equitable remedy of:
[A] medical monitoring system in order to keep track of
each member of the class so as to determine whether any
health problems develop and . . . to ascertain whether there
is any [relation] between such problem[s] and the exposure
to radiation. 1'0
It is submitted that this type of relief, admittedly without prece-
dent, is appropriate in a radiation injury suit for two reasons.
First, it mitigates the potentially harsh effects of the statute of lim-
itations on plaintiffs exposed to radiation but lacking present pal-
pable symptoms; second, it protects the defendant by leaving on
the plaintiff the burden of proving that the exposure to radiation
was the legal cause of the injury (a burden which has proved dif-
ficult to sustain).0 2 The granting of such relief to a plaintiff
from this exposure. It is extimated that such a dose would kill one quarter of
those exposed and induce serious injury in 90% of the remaining cases. Since
the incident, Evans has had vomiting spells. Lyons & Lyons, The Hidden Pas-
sengers, WNEW AM/FM News, May 6-12, 1974.
97. Calculations from inspection of the aircraft involved indicate that esti-
mated exposure for the Boeing 727 (Flight 311) to be 7.1 Rems for males and
10.6 Reins for females. AiRcRAFr RADATiON HEARINGS, supra note 1, at 20.
98. 170 millirem, or 0.17 Rems. See note 15, supra.
99. Penna v. Value Engineering & Delta Air Lines, Civil No. 74-407
(D.D.C., filed May 9, 1974).
100. Letter to author from Mr. Phillip Silverman, attorney for plaintiff
[copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
101. Id.
102. The confusion over proximate cause should not absolve the plaintiff
from the duty to demonstrate that radiation was, in fact, a definite caus-
ative factor of his injuries. On the issue of causation, the plaintiff, in
general, must bear the burden of proof, he must offer evidence sufficient
to support a conclusion that defendant's conduct, more likely than not,
was a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility
of such causation is insufficient. When the evidence offered leaves the
matter as one of pure speculation or conjecture or the probabilities are
at best an even balance the court should award a directed verdict for
the defendant.
19
Atchley: Air Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Passenger Protect
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
seeking compensation for radiation injuries not presently apparent
in a case coming under the Warsaw Convention would be espe-
cially fitting. This remedy would afford the victim an opportunity
for compensation otherwise denied him by combination of the stat-
ute of limitations and the wording of the Warsaw Convention.
IV. CONCLUSION
The methods of international regulation of the air transport
of radioactive materials are clearly in need of significant revision.
The experience of the United States, the largest and most tech-
nologically sophisticated of the IAEA member states, clearly dem-
onstrates a need for such revision. Immediate steps should be
taken to insure that the dismal safety record of the United States
is not repeated on an international scale.
Utilizing his powers under the Transportation Safety Act of
1974, the Secretary of Transportation should move to supplement
the Act with a national system of monitoring radioactive materials
shipments at major airports. Contemporaneously with the adop-
tion of these measures in our own national law, the United States
should call for a convening of the IAEA Panel of Experts and urge
that the following measures be adopted by that body: (1) the
banning of all radioactive materials, except necessary radiophar-
maceuticals, from passenger carrying aircraft; (2) the establish-
ment of radiation detection facilities at those major airports which
handle the majority of radioactive materials; (3) the establishment
of a mandatory system of film badges and personal dosimeters to
be used on aircraft carrying radioactive materials; and (4) the re-
duction of the TI limit for any one package from 10 to 3.
It is recognized, however, that even in the face of such revi-
sions, accidents will likely continue to occur in international avia-
tion. 10 3  At present, the combined effect of the various statutes
of limitations, and the bodily injury limitation of the Warsaw Con-
vention deprives wrongfully exposed passengers of any remedy
should the symptoms of their injury take a long time to appear.
The courts, as well as various modem writers1°4 agree that
the aim of the Warsaw Convention is to provide uniformity in the
Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes: The Low Level
Radiation Example, 56 IOWA L. REV. 531, 549 (1971).
103. See note 69, supra.
104. See, e.g., KRIENDLER, supra note 88, at 106. See also Conference Inter-
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rules of liability in international air transportation. This purpose
can best be served in the unique situation of time-delayed radia-
tion injury by the application of judicial ingenuity to the solution
of the problem. Should another incident occur such as the Delta
Airlines case, 10 5 the remedy sought in that case should be con-
sidered by courts in cases arising under the jurisdiction of the War-
saw Convention as a practical remedy where one is not now avail-
able. Until such time as this hazard can be better controlled, the
purpose of the Warsaw Convention commands this, and injured
passengers deserve no less.
Dennis B. Atchley
national De Droit Prive Aerien, Varsovie 17 (1930); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
The United States And the Warsaw Convention, 80 HAv. L. REv. 497 (1967).
105. Penna v. Value Engineering & Delta Airlines, Civil No. 74-407,
(D.D.C., filed May 9, 1974).
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